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"SHE BREAKS JUST LIKE A LITTLE GIRL"*: NEONATICIDE,
THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF
"ORDINARY COMMON SENSE"
MICHAEL L. PERLIN*"
Some day, someone will probably propose dividing all law cases
into two categories: those that make the national news and those
that do not.' Commentators have written extensively about the
impact of famous cases (is there anyone now reading this article
who is not flashing on O.J.?) in different contexts including, (1) how
the publicizing of a case may affect its verdict,2 (2) how the public
heuristically uses the vivid case as a representative of all cases,' (3)
how the public heuristically assumes that a specific tactic or
defense raised in one case is frequently used in other cases,4 and (4)
* BOB DYiAN, LYIucs, 1962-1985 231 (1985).
** Professor of Law, New York Law School, New York, New York. The author wishes
to thank Marissa Costales for her outstanding research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Daniel Filler, From Law to Content in the New Media Marketplace, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1739, 1759-60 (2002) (citations omitted) ("And when breaking legal news occurs-as
it did in Bush v. Gore, in the O.J. Simpson trial, and more recently in the Andrea Yates child-
murder trial-many stations, including the news networks, bumped other content and
dedicated extensive time to these legal proceedings.").
The line between reality and fiction is often hopelessly blurred. See generally RICHARD
SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop: THE VANIsHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR
CuLTURE (2000) (discussing the consequences of merging legal and popular culture). See also
Wayne R. LaFave, Essay, The Fourth Amendment as a "Big Time" TV Fad, 53 Hastings
L.J. 265,265 (2001) ("At a party recently, a woman was overheard to say: 'My husband and
I love watching The Practice.' It always gives us something to talk about we hadn't thought
much about before, I don't know, like the Fourth Amendment.'") (quoting Julie Salamon,
Television Review: Justice and Lawyers Who May Not Comb Their Hair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2000, at E8).
2. See, e.g., Wendy Davis, The O.J. Effect, Since the Simpson Trial, Juries Have Been
Reluctant to Acquit Celebrities, LEGALAFF. Oct. 2002, at 18, 19 ("Since the Simpson verdict,
juries have repeatedly defied the predictions of legal observers by throwing the book at
high-profile defendants: Andrea Yates, the mentally ill Texas woman who drowned her five
children .... ").
3. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the
'Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1996) ("The Simpson
case is so aberrant that it does not even represent a very useful piece of empirical evidence
[as to how the criminal justice system can be improved].").
4. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1404 (1997) (citations omitted)[hereinafter Perlin,
Borderline]("And of course, the Dan White 'Twinkle defense' continues to be seen as some
kind of norm in insanity cases."). Interestingly, at least one recent study of infanticide
emphasized that the use of a defendant's mental status to mitigate responsibility in such
circumstances "is no Twinkle defense.... "Janet Ford, Susan Smith and Other Homicidal
Mothers-In Search of the Punishment That Fits the Crime, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 521,
532-33 (1996).
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how a verdict in a famous case can lead to changes in the
substantive law.5
But, to the best of my knowledge, little has been written about
the ways that the publicity given to one case involving a specific
mental condition has led to a significant sea change in the ways
that subsequent jurors decide cases involving defendants with a
similar mental condition.6
I believe that our treatment of defendants with postpartum
psychosis7 who commit neonaticide8 is an important example of this
last category, and I wish to explore some preliminary ideas about
that category of cases. Consideration of this numerically-unimportant
but politically-significant subset will illuminate much about what
is morally corrupt and what is incoherent about our insanity
defense policies.
I have devoted much of my academic career to attempting to
unpack and respond to a series of myths that have developed about
the insanity defense, and that continue to dominate our insanity
defense discourse.9 There is no question in my mind that the vast
majority of 'incorrect' insanity verdicts (that is, where the jury 'gets
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 138-42
(1994) [hereinafter PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE](discussing the relationship between John W.
Hinckley's insanity acquittal and the adoption of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984).
No one ever asks the reverse question: "Had Hinckley been convicted, would that have
proven that the insanity defense system 'worked?" See id. at 265, n.7 (quoting, Richard
Rogers, The American Psychological Association's Position on the Insanity Defense:
Empiricism Versus Emotionalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 840, 840 (1987) ("[Calls to abolish
the insanity verdict] reflected a 'tenuous logic: if the verdict was wrong, then the standard
[must have been] wrong."')).
6. There was no question that John Hinckley, byway of contrast, was mentally ill. The
controversy centered on his diagnosis and the relationship between that mental illness and
his responsibility for the crime. See RICHARD J. BONNIE, ET AL., A CASE STUDY IN THE
INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 28-31 (2d ed. 2000).
7. For a comprehensive definition of postpartum psychosis, see Brenda Barton, When
Murdering Hands Rock The Cradle: An Overview of America's Incoherent Treatment of
Infanticidal Mothers, 51 SMU L. REV. 591, 602-03 (1998). See infra Part II.
8. "'Neonaticide' is defined as the killing of a child 24 hours old or younger." Phillip J.
Resnick, Murder of the Newborn:A Psychiatric Review ofNeonaticide, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1414 (1970). For an early consideration, see also, Morris Brozovsky & Harvey Falit,
Neonaticide: Clinical and Psychodynamic Considerations, 10 J. AM. ACAD. CHILDPSYCHIATRY
673 (1971).
For a discussion on the ways that neonaticide is differentiated from other forms of
infanticide, see CHERYL MEYER& MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILLTHEIRCHILDREN:
UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE "PROM MOM" 20-31 (2001)
[hereinafter MOTHERS WHO KILL].
9. See, e.g., PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5; Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4;
Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense and
Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, OCS]; Michael L. Perlin,
Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 599 (1989-90) [hereinafter Perlin, Myths].
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it wrong') involve cases in which defendants who meet the
substantive test for responsibility are nonetheless convicted.10 On the
other hand, I am also convinced that there are three numerically
minute but socially significant mini-universes of cases in which
defendants who were, in fact, responsible were nonetheless found
not guilty by reason of insanity as a kind of nullification device,11 a
group of cases I refer to as "empathy outliers."12 The first, and most
important of these categories are some cases of neonaticide. 13
Most neonaticide cases are unknown to the general public
outside of the immediate geographic area where the killing took
place.'4 On the other hand, both the Susan Smith15 and the Andrea
10. For an array of cases, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL 237-38 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN]. See also Perlin, Myths,
supra note 9, at 617. On the significance of 'wrong verdicts" in the development of other
emotionally-charged areas of the law, see Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 8.
11. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1415, 1420-21. "Yet, as long as seventy-five
years ago, William A. White responded to these charges: '(I)n my personal experience I have
never known a criminal to escape conviction on the plea of insanity where the evidence did
not warrant such a verdict (except injury nullification cases].'" Id., at 1415 (quoting WILLIAM
A. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1923)).
At least one commentator has questioned the impact that the verdict in the O.J. Simpson
case - viewed by some as a sort of nullification verdict - has had on subsequent high-profile,
'celebrity' cases:
While juries have always had the power to nullify-to acquit despite evidence
that strongly supports a conviction-the phrase jury nullification' gained fresh
currency after the Simpson trial. Most references don't compliment happy-to-
acquit juries, who find themselves accused of either going wild or being swayed
by a high-priced defense lawyer. These examples are anecdotal-six acquittals
out of thousands of cases-but they were invoked so often in the national press
that the phenomenon became a cultural touchstone. Concern about making
that error has apparently influenced jurors ever since. Since the Simpson
verdict, juries have repeatedly defied the predictions of legal observers by
throwing the book at high-profile defendants: Andrea Yates, the mentally ill
Texas woman who drowned her five children; Louise Woodward, the Boston
nanny convicted in 1997 of killing the baby in her charge; and Marjorie Knoller
and Robert Noel in the San Francisco mauling-dog case .... These convictions
amount to the opposite of conventional jury nullification, but they are a related
form of defiance.
Davis, supra note,2, at 18-19.
12. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 193. Prof. Michelle Oberman discusses this
specifically in the infanticide context in Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern
American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 42 (1996).
13. This is not to say that no neonaticidal mothers are insane. See, e.g., People v. Massip,
271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (App. 1990), transferred & vacated, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 824 P.2d 588
(1992); State v. Hudson, 1999 WL 77844 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 19, 1999). See also MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 283-84 n.995 (2d ed. 2002) (citing
cases) [hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW]. On those areas in which defendants
appear to be over-acquitted on insanity grounds, see Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at
1420-21, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 96-97.
14. What percentage of the general public, for example, is familiar with the case
of Laura Hudson or the case of Sharon Klafta? See Hudson, 1999 WL 77844; State v.
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Yates" cases- neither neonaticides (a category limited to killings
within the first twenty-four hours of a baby's life)-held us in
thrall, 7 and served as the vivid heuristic18 for a national "debate"
on neonaticide, and its relationship to "mother love," 9 abortion
rights,2" permissive childraising,2' and, even, President Clinton's
impeachment trial.' Kris Franklin's apt observation about the laws
ofsodomy-"Sodomy decisions are fascinating because they broadcast
not only legal theorizing, but also a political stance"23- is equally
applicable here.
Lost in all of this is a series of questions of importance and
interest to lawyers, policy makers, and other informed citizens who
do not rely on "talk TV" to inform their political view.2 The
question that I wish to address is the relationship between the
neonaticidal defendant and the insanity defense. This question also
Klafta, 831 P.2d 512 (Haw. 1992).
15. For an excellent overview of the Smith case, see Ford, supra note 4.
16. For an excellent overview of the Yates case, see Sandy Meng Shan Liu, Note,
Postpartum Psychosis: A Legitimate Defense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?, 4
SCHOLAR 339 (2002).
17. On why some cases are self-selected by the media for over-attention, see MOTHERS
WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 47.
18. On the role of the vividness heuristic in mental disability law, see PERLIN, HIDDEN,
supra note 10, at 10. See also Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always
Well-Hidden': The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 201, 231 (1996) (citations omitted) ("We know how, as a result of the vividness
heuristic, one salient case can lead to the restructuring of an entire body ofjurisprudence.").
19. See, e.g., Katherine O'Donovan, "Real" Mothers for Abandoned Children, 36 LAW
& Soc'y REv. 347, 358 (2002); Jennie Lusk, Note, Modern New Mexican Neonaticide:
Tranquilizing with this Jewel /The Torments ofConfusion, 11 TEx. J. WOMEN& L. 93,95 (2002).
20. See generally Hunter Baker, Storming the Gates of a Massive Cultural Investment:
Reconsidering Roe in Light of its Flawed Foundation and Undesirable Consequences, 14
REGENT U. L. REv. 35 (2001-02) (discussing abortion rights' ascendency in modern American
society). The relationship between the "virulent, often violent attack on abortion rights" and
our infanticide policies is examined in Judith E. Macfarlane, Note, Neonaticide and the
'Ethos of Maternity': Traditional Criminal Law Defenses and the Novel Syndrome, 5
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 175, 179 (1998).
21. For a discussion on public attitudes to the case of Rebecca Hopfer, see Barton, supra
note 7, at 611. See also State v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321, 328-29 (Ohio App. 2d 1996).
22. See, e.g., Karin Lewicki, Can You Forgive Her?: Legal Ambivalence Toward
Infanticide, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 683,687 (1999) (discussing obsession in todays culture
with trial coverage as illustrated in Susan Smith's, O.J. Simpson's, and President Clinton's
trials); Michele Goodwin, The Black Woman in The Attic: Law, Metaphor And Madness in
Jane Eyre, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 599 n.6 (1999) ('Recent examples of legal literary drama
would include the Independent Prosecutor's Referral to Congress on the Impeachment of
President William Jefferson Clinton, abstracts from the infamous O.J. Simpson civil and
criminal trials, and the police reports from the Susan Smith infanticide case.").
23. Kris Franklin, The Rhetorics of Legal Authority Constructing Authoritativeness, the
'Ellen Effect," and the Example of Sodomy Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 49, 57 (2001).
24. On the significance of the "media frenzy" in highly-publicized neonaticide cases, see
MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 19.
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immediately leads to many 'second generation' questions: Does the
defense apply? Should it? Should there be a special or separate
insanity-type defense for such cases? How do jurors respond?"
What can we learn from all of this? Does the jurisprudence of such
cases differ from the jurisprudence of other sorts of 'syndromic'
behavior in insanity defense cases (e.g., battered spouse syndrome,
rape trauma syndrome)? Has the application of the insanity defense
in such cases changed since the Susan Smith and Andrea Yates
cases? I cannot answer all of these questions, but I wish to at least
raise them, with the hopes that they will remain "on the table" as
this debate continues.
We may take it as a given that our insanity defense
jurisprudence is incoherent. 6 This incoherence is made even less
rational and normative in cases where the defense is based on
postpartum depression or other postpartum psychosis. This
category of cases reflects and refracts a trompe d'oeil illusion that
must be addressed: whether we look at postpartum depression and
psychosis cases as a reflection of the etiology of mental illness, or as
a reflection of societal attitudes towards one population susceptible
tojarringly conflicting stereotypes (mothers with mental disabilities
who act violently towards their new-born children).
The incoherence of our insanity defense jurisprudence is
especially troubling in cases involving women who kill their small
children. For decades, this cohort was one of the mini-universes in
which juror empathy (or, perhaps, juror disbelief that a mother could
criminally kill her infant or young child) led to insanity acquittals,
even in cases in which evidence of non-responsibility was limited (I
have referred to this cohort in the past as "empathy outliers").27
Since the Susan Smith case (and the societal outrage that this case
unleashed toward that specific defendant), jurors-using a warped
and self-referential type of "ordinary common sense" (OCS)24-have
become increasingly punitive toward all defendants charged with
the death of their small children, even in cases that are in no way
like (factually or clinically) the Smith case, and even in cases in
which the evidence of non-responsibility is overwhelming. This
radical shift in position flows partially from how sanism pervades
25. For a discussion on how public misperceptions of the inflated use of the insanity
defense contaminates neonaticide discourse, see MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8.
26. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA
on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV.
193, 202 (2000); Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1424; PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 5, at 406-15.
27. Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1421; PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 193.
28. See Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 6.
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our mental disability law jurisprudence and partially from the
conflicts in stereotypes that are present in such cases. It is
impossible to understand this area of the law without a full
recognition of these factors.
This area of the law is especially incoherent even when compared
to insanity defense cases involving other 'syndromic' behavior.29 On
one hand, we are especially punitive towards such defendants
because they have violently violated our precepts of motherhood. On
the other, we are more willing to find some of these defendants not
guilty by reason of insanity than we are in cases involving almost
any other kind of insanity pleader (again, almost in a way that
imitates nullification verdicts)"0 as a reflection of our desire to
maintain an inviolate image of "mother love."3' The shift here is
primarily a result of the media response to the Susan Smith case.
I argue further that it is impossible to understand this area of the
law without a full consideration of the malignant and corrosive
impact of "ordinary common sense, "32 sanism33 and pretextuality34
on this area of the law.
Thus, in Part I, I discuss the research on neonaticide, and
highlight how it reflects our massive societal ambivalence about the
underlying social issues. In Part II, I discuss the range of mental
disorders manifested by neonaticidal mothers. In Part III, I
consider the application of the insanity defense to these cases, focus
on the "empathy outlier" 5 phenomenon, and then look at the extent
how the public construction of such cases has changed in the
aftermath of Susan Smith and Andrea Yates. In Part IV, I explain
29. See, e.g., PERLIN, MENTALDiSABIITYLAwsupra note 13, §§ 9A-9.3 to 9.3e, at 264-84.
30. For a recent helpful overview, see Irwin Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal
and Psychological Perspectives, 66 BROOK L. REV. 1207 (2001). See also Andrew D. Leipold,
Rethinking Jury Nulliication, 82 VA. L REv. 253 (1996). I discuss this in an insanity defense
context in Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 706 n.501, and in Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 40-46.
31. See Lusk, supra note 19, at 95:
Basically, it is our belief that society, in its desire to preserve an illusion of
'mother love', is hesitant to carefully scrutinize the mother-child relationship
and recognize realistically that the most reasonable target for a mother's
frustration and anger is her child. Instead, to preserve our illusions about
'mother love', we categorize women who murder their children as 'insane.'
(citing Oberman, supra note 12 (quoting Henry J. Steadman, et al., The Use of the Insanity
Defense, in A REPORT TO Gov. HUGH L. CAREY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YoRK, 37,
68-69 (1978))).
32. See generally Perlin, OCS, supra note 9.
33. See generally PERIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10, at 36-58; Michael L. Perlin, "Half
Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental
Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 3, 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter
Perlin, Half-Wracked]. See generally Part IV infra.
34. See PERLIN, HIDDENsupra note 10, at 59-75; Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 33, at 5.
35. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1420-21 (citation omitted).
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"ordinary common sense" (OCS), sanism and pretextuality, and
relate these factors to this jurisprudence. In Part V, I conclude that
the dissonance created in such cases is so profound that it has
distorted this jurisprudence beyond any level of coherence, and it
has thwarted our desperate desires to impose a comforting level of
OCS on this area of the law.
My title of this article comes from the refrain of Bob Dylan's
song Just Like a Woman 6:
She makes love just like a woman, yes she does,
And she aches just like a woman,
But she breaks just like a little girl."
Just Like a Woman is a song not without political controversy
in the Dylan oeuvre. It was criticized by Marion Meade in 1971 as
a "complete catalogue of sexist slurs."3" The critics Robert Shelton
and Tim Riley disagree. Shelton argues persuasively that the song
reflects Dylan "ironically toying with [sexist] platitudes."39 Riley-
presciently, given the topic I am discussing here-concludes, "It
straddles an almost inconceivably thin line between compassion
and scorn, forgiveness and retribution." 4° To a great extent, that
"thin line"4' is a perfect metaphor for the issues we are discussing
today.
PART I. NEONATICIDE AND AMBIVALENCE
All trial lawyering in jury cases involves and demands
storytelling.42 The effective trial lawyer paints a picture for the jury
using a schema with which jurors can identify. 4 This is obviously
36. BOB DYLAN, LYRICS, 1962-1985 231 (1985).
37. Id.
38. ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MusIc OF BOB DYLAN 323 (Da
Capo ed., 1997). Similar sentiments are easily found on the Internet. See www.google.com
(search: "JUST LIKE A WOMAN" AND SEXIST AND DYLAN) (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
39. SHELTON, supra note 38, at 323.
40. TIM RILEY, HARD RAIN: A DYLAN COMMENTARY 139 (1992).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, The Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 205, 213 (2001) ("Storytelling 'is a demand.., for moral meaning, a demand that
sequences of events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama.'")
(quoting Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON
NARRATIVE 1 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981).
43. "[Jjurors' determination[s] of'what really happened' will often be strongly influenced
by the degree to which the concrete detailed stories told by the parties at trial match the
instances or prototypes in the jurors' relevant schemas." Albert J. Moore, Trial By Schema:
Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273, 292 (1989). See also Nancy
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easier in some cases than in others (intuitively, it is easier to create
a story with which jurors can empathize if one is representing an
abused child with a disability rather than, for example, a contract
killer). Storytelling, however, can hit a roadblock when the story is
dissonant with the jurors' self-referential and non-reflective
"ordinary common sense" (OCS)" ("I see it that way, therefore
everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that's the way
it is"). 5 In criminal procedure, byway of example, "OCS presupposes
two self-evident truths: 1) everyone knows how to assess an
individual's behavior, and 2) everyone knows when to blame someone
for doing wrong."46
Not surprisingly, many of the greatest areas of OCS-caused
dissonance emerge in cases involving family relationships ("If Joe
was that bad,. . . why didn't the defendant divorce him? Why didn't
she just leave him?"),"7 sexual assault ("Look at the way she was
dressed; she was asking for it")4 and mental illness ("If he had just
tried harder, he really could have gotten better").49 Areas such as
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap, 89
PSYCHOL. BULL. 246, 251-54 (1981); Loretta J. Stalans & Arthur J. Lurigio, Lay and
Professionals' Beliefs About Crime and Criminal Sentencing: A Need for Theory, Perhaps
Schema Theory, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 333-47 (1990).
44. See, e.g., Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 22-33; PERLIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10, at 16-20.
45. See, e.g., Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields
in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729,737 (1988); Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism",
46 SMUL. REv. 373, 380 n.46 (1992). On the pre-reflective component of OCS see for example,
Keri K Gould & Michael L. Perlin, 'Johnny's in the Basement/ Mixing up His Medicine'.:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 339, 357 (2000).
46. Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 24-25 n.99, citing Sherwin, supra note 1, at 738. See
also Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes
Toward Sentencing, 16 CANAD. J. BEHAV. SCI. REV. CANAD. SCI. COMP. 269,275 (1984) ("[The
public) appears simply to accept the information they have as adequate" in assessing
perceived leniency of criminal sentences); Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond,
Formation and Change in Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing: Misperception and
Discontent, 14 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 199 (1990) (examining impressions behind public opinion
regarding judges leniency in criminal sentencing).
47. State v. Griffiths, 610 P.2d 522, 543 (Idaho 1980) (statement of prosecutor in
closing argument).
48. See, e.g., HuBERT S. FEILD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 54 (1980) (noting
that, of a 1056-person sample, eleven percent believed that "if a woman was raped, she
was asking for it," and sixty-six percent believed a woman's appearance or behavior could
provoke rape).
49. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
Sanist Attitudes Be Undone? 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 31 n.90 (1993-94):
See also J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238
(1990) ("Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors, 'if Hinckley had emotional
problems, theywere largely his own fault'); State v. Duckworth, 496 So.2d 624,
635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that juror who felt defendant would be
responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" could not be excused
for cause); K. GOULD, ET AL., CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WITH TRIAL DISABI'rIES:
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these are treasure troves of self-righteousness, narrow thinking,
and "atrophied [ I moral development."5 ° These characteristics are
reflected in attitudes towards the cases about which I am writing
in this article: a universe that is statistically infinitesimal, but
charged with social significance.5 "
We are "morbid[ly] fascinat[ed]" with neonaticide cases.52 Here,
our stereotypes of motherhood,' of mental illness,' of "good girls" and
"bad girls,"5" and of madness and badness56 all commingle in a
dissonant melange of conflicting images. Until we confront the
extent of this dissonance," we can never hope to extract any
meaningful doctrinal strands from this counterintuitive legal jumble.59
Infanticide (and, specifically, neonaticide) was, in many cases,
"condoned, encouraged, or mandated by law" until the fourth
century,' and has been practiced in most cultures-Judaism being
the one major exception 61-until the present day. Its ubiquity is
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPETENCY ASSISTANCE, 68 (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (trial judge responding to National Center for
State Courts' survey indicated that, in his mind, defendants who were
incompetent to stand trial could have communicated with and understood their
attorneys "if they [had] only wanted").
Id. at 31 n.90.
50. See Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 644. See also id. at 668 (citing MICHAEL MOORE,
LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 244-45 (1984) (discussing Professor
Michael Moore's characterization of the insanity defense as a "morality play")).
51. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 19.
52. Id.
53. See Liu, supra note 16, at 378.
54. See, e.g., JUDITH S. NEAMAN, SUGGESTION OF THE DEVIL: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS
31, 144 (1975) (addressing the stereotype of persons with mental illness as evil).
55. See, e.g., Jacqueline St. Joan & Nancy Ehrenreich, Putting Theory into Practice: A
Battered Women's Clemency Clinic, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 171, 214 n. 147 (2001).
56. See Ania Wilczynski, Images of Women Who Kill Their Infants: The Mad and the Bad,
2 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 71 (1991). On this image in insanity defense jurisprudence in
general, see Peter Margulies, The 'Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad'" Procedures
for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36
RUTGERS L. REv. 793 (1984). The phrase in Professor Margulies' title is found in Benham v.
Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050, 1076 (D. Ga. 1980).
57. This is especially telling in neonaticide cases in which "juries often find that [a]
woman accused of neonaticide does not correspond to their imagination of a murderess."
Lusk, supra note 19, at 104.
58. On the parallel issues ofjudicial cognitive dissonance in insanity defense cases, see
Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 33-36.
59. Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 644 ("The insanity defense is, to a significant majority
of the American public, counter-intuitive.").
60. Lewicki, supra note 22, at 685.
61. See Kathryn L. Moseley, The History of Infanticide in Western Society, 1 ISSUES L. &
MED. 345, 351 (1986) ("Jews had consistently resisted the societal pressures to kill their
unwanted or disabled offspring, equating infanticide with murder"); Barton, supra note 7,
at 595 (citing Cynthia Bouillon-Jensen, History of Infanticide, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 1201 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995)). ("Among the first to condemn the killing
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recorded in "mythological, philosophical, religious, and historical
texts ..... 2 In early England, as many as twenty-five percent of all
killings were infanticides;63 in colonial America, that number was
estimated to be thirty-three percent.64
It is far less common today. Nonetheless, cases, especially those
subject to saturation publicity,65 serve as "projective tests" 66 that
reflect our massive societal ambivalence about motherhood,
sexuality, social norms, and interpersonal relationships, and our
shock when individuals act in a way "wholly alien" from our OCS,67
especially when the defendant presents herself as a "nice, middle
class [Caucasian, implied] girl."68 With a review of the relevant
literature, a number of points become clear:
1. The idea that a mother can kill her newborn consciously and
with full criminal responsibility is inconceivable to many jurors, as
it conflicts so radically and drastically with their OCS schemas of
motherhood and "mother love"69 or the "cultural myth of the good
mother."7" In many cases, this translates to a crime that "only a
mad woman could do.""1 The alienation jurors feel in such cases
of infants were the Jewish scholars.").
62. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 177. For full historical surveys, see Liu, supra note 16,
at 350-52; MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 1-7; Lusk, supra note 19, at 101-03.
63. Barton, supra note 7, at 594.
64. Stuart Gordan, Mothers Who Kill Their Children, 6 BuFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 86,96 (1998).
65. Neither of the two most famous infanticide cases of the current era-that of Susan
Smith and that of Andrea Yates-involved neonaticide. On the other hand, publicity has been
disproportionate in cases of other middle-class, Caucasian girls and women, and there is little
in the public discourse that seems to differentiate between these two different categories of
killings. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 176 (discussing "the sensationalized 'poster
girls' ofneonaticide,"). See also id. at 178, discussing [Melissal Drexler, the suburban mother
of the "Prom Baby." See generally MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 47 (discussing cases
of, inter alia, Drexler and Amy Grossberg and stating that "[Blecause they were relatively
affluent, attractive young white girls from seemingly 'good' families, their crimes are
shocking and therefore deemed newsworthy").
66. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4:
[T~he insanity defense has always been a symbol and a screen. It has always
served as a litmus test for how we feel about a host of social, political, cultural
and behavioral issues that far transcend the narrow questions of whether a
specific defendant should be held responsible for what-on its surface-is a
criminal act, or how responsibility should be legally calibrated, or of the sort of
institution in which a successful insanity acquittee should be housed.
Id. at 1377.
67. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 248.
68. Cf. Lusk, supra note 19, at 94 (citations omitted) ("Now, families realize that 'even
nice girls do it' outside the obligations of marriage...
69. Id. at 180.
70. E. Selene Steelman, A Question of Revenge: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and a
Proposed Diminished Capacity Defense For Homicidal Mothers, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
261, 263-64 (2002).
71. Ford, supra note 4, at 535 (citation omitted).
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may well flow from the way that mother love is seen as a "moral
imperative,"72 or, perhaps because the "infanticidal mother ...
damages the community by preemptively accusing it of
abandonment."71 "The myth of motherhood, so ingrained in the way
in which the ambitions, desires, and needs of women are viewed
and accommodated, cannot include in its account a state of mind so
abominable, unnatural, and depraved that a child could be imperiled
by its own mother."74
2. In some cases, though, jurors use very different schemas.
When women are judged harshly by jurors (not to mention the
public), that judgment is often a function of the extent to which she
personally varies from the social stereotype of the "good mother"
7
and exhibits behavior that is perceived simply as "unnatural."76
Women who failed to conform to assumed gender characteristics in
this context have been simply perceived as "bad."
77
3. Notwithstanding these radically different attitudes towards
defendants in such cases, and notwithstanding the fact that
neonaticides "cut across all economic classes and cultural strata,"
78
there are points in common in almost all neonaticide cases:
* Neonaticidal crimes are "crime[s] of desperation."79
" The mothers are generally young, single,80 immature,
socially isolated, in total (or near-total) denial of their
pregnancy,8'
72. See Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 223.
73. Lewicki, supra note 22, at 686.
74. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 248.
75. Liu, supra note 16, at 377 (citing LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER,
ENDANGERED CHILDREN: NEONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE, AND FILICIDE 3 (2000)).
76. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 226 (referring to divergence from the antenatal bond).
77. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 75, at 3.
78. Macfarlane, supra note 20 at 178 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Charles L. Briggs &
Carla Mantini-Briggs, "Bad Mothers" and the Threat to Civil Society: Race, Cultural
Reasoning, and the Institutionalization of Social Inequality in a Venezuelan Infanticide Trial,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 299, 299-302 (2000).
79. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 13.
80. Thirty-six of thirty-seven in one recent sample studied. See id. at 48.
81. Oberman, supra note 12, at 24; MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 53; Lita Linzer
Schwartz & Natalie Isser, Neonaticide: An Appropriate Application for Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 19 BEHAV. SCL & L. 703, 706 (2001); Morris Brozovsky & Harvey Falit,
Neonaticide: Clinical and Psychodynamic Considerations, 10 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY
673, 679 (1971); Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 197. For a discussion on the way that many
such defendants sought to hide their pregnancies from their families, see Macfarlane, supra
note 20, at 187. See also MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 49 (on fear of disclosure); Lusk,
supra note 19:
Neonaticidal mothers may report mistaking labor pains for gas pains or flu
symptoms. They give birth alone, often in bathroom stalls or bathrooms,
perhaps because they do not anticipate a birth. The birth of a baby comes as a
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in a state of profound"emotional detachment.8 2
* The mothers virtually all suffer from some sort of mental
disorder. Even in cases where there is no mental disorder,
at the very least, the mothers' behavior is marked by "fear,
depression, [and] panic,"8 as well as "shame and guilt," 4
often followed by "abject remorse."8 5
* All had, at the most, "attenuated ... relationships to the
men who impregnated them.'
* Although there are a variety of sociocultural and economic
causes for neonaticide,"7 there are some markers shared by
most neonaticidal defendants. Not all, but a significant
number of the neonaticidal mothers in question, "grew up
or currently live [s] in poverty, [are] under-educated, [have]
a history of abuse (both physical and sexual), remain[
isolated from social supports, [have] depressive and
suicidal tendencies, and [are] usually experiencing
rejection by a male lover at the time of the murder[s.""8
4. Our societal ambivalence about these mothers is
overwhelming. 9 Infanticide cases reflect society's mixed responses
of "anger, empathy, and a profound yet unarticulated sense that
these cases differ from other forms of homicide,'e or, conversely
shock, forcing them to come to grips with facts and consequences they and their
families have been at some pains to deny. The birth can come as a shock to
teachers, counselors, and doctors as well. The mothers suddenly face the
consequences, economic along with the emotional, moral, and career, of giving
birth. They may fear their parents' wrath, shattering a secure and supportive
family, admitting their sexual sophistication, or abandonment by their mothers.
Whatever the source of fear, it leads to denial commonly so absolute that the
neonaticidal teen mothers never fully admit the fact of pregnancy until giving
birth.
Id. at 97-98 (citations omitted).
82. Lusk, supra note 19, at 99.
83. Schwartz & Isser, supra note 75, at 706; See also Robert L. Sadoff, Mothers Who Kill
Their Children, 25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 601 (1995).
84. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 44.
85. Id. at 54.
86. Oberman, supra note 12, at 23-24.
87. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 17.
88. Ford, supra note 4, at 538 (citing Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single
Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex.Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905,909-14 (1993)).
89. Lewicki, supra note 22, at 709-10 (quoting, in part, Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race
and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Times, 35
WASHBURN L.J. 225, 226 (1996) ("Infanticide is a crime knit up inextricably with society's
most basic relationships, and as such is a crime inevitably defined by framework[s] of rules
of social control through which certain beliefs and images are privileged, legitimated and
ratified and myths are given power)).
90. Oberman, supra note 12, at 20.
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"abhorrence, rage and disbelief."9 ' This ambivalence can be
measured along several different socially-constructed scales.
Michelle Oberman, for instance, observes that, in medieval Europe,
married infanticidal women often escaped prison, whereas
unmarried infanticidal women"generally received capital sentences
that were carried out in excruciating manners."92 Oberman's
analysis of contemporary infanticide laws underscores how this
ambivalence has continued:
The infanticide statutes from around the world evidence a
shared sense that it is both legally and morally wrong for a
mother to kill her infant. At the same time, they evince an
equally powerful consensus that, both in terms of its genesis and
in terms of maternal culpability, infanticide is a far different
crime from other homicides.9"
5. Almost all neonaticide cases show what Michelle Oberman
refers to as:
[Patterned circumstances that lead to the infants' death...
[tihe women experienced severe cramping and stomach pains,
which they often attributed to a need to defecate. They spent
hours alone, most often on the toilet, often while others were
present in their homes. At some point during these hours, they
realized that they were in labor. They endured the full course of
labor and delivery without making any noise.'
Neonaticidal behavior is thus "absolutely at odds with
normative conceptions of motherhood and maternity commonly held
by society."95 As a result of all this, our attitudes towards such cases
reflect a dialectic of condemnation and mercy," and our reactions
"tend to be at one extreme or another."97 Legal disposition of such
cases reflect this ambivalence."' Although surveys differ, it appears
that the insanity defense is successful in one-third to one-half of all
such cases99 (and contrast this with data showing that the insanity
91. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 225.
92. Oberman, supra note 12, at 8 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 19.
94. Id. at 24-25.
95. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 208.
96. Oberman, supra note 12, at 5.
97. Anne Brusca, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1133, 1166 (1990).
98. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 7, at 606-09 (discussing cases).
99. Daniel Katkin, Postpartun Psychosis, Infanticide, and Criminal Justice, in
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defense is successful in a fraction of one percent of all criminal
cases);1"° the remainder are split between those involving relatively
light sentences and those with puzzlingly lengthy sentences.' lThis
ambivalence is reflected both in the wide charges brought (ranging
from "unlawful disposition of a body.., to first-degree murder"), 2
and in eventual case dispositions.0 3 Again, Michelle Oberman
succinctly quotes a Chicago defense lawyer on the pattern of
"over-charging and under-convicting" in neonaticide cases. 10 4 This
pattern perfectly captures the underlying ambivalence.
PART II. POSTPARTUM ILLNESSES
Most mothers who kill their infant children (especially those
who commit neonaticide, that is, who kill them in the first twenty-
four hours of their lives) suffer from some sort of postpartum
mental disorder.' This observation is nothing new; it was
recognized as early as the time of Hippocrates."° There is a range of
postpartum disorders, ranging from "maternity blues," to postpartum
POSTPARTrM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: APicTuRE PUzzLE 275,279 (James Hamilton & Patricia
Harberger eds., 1992); Brusca, supra note 97, at 1166. Cf. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 195
(only one of a sample of eight cases involved an insanity defense). On the incidence of
insanity defense pleas and success rates in all felony cases, see for example, Perlin,
Borderline, supra note 4, at 1395-96 (citations omitted) ("Researchers have demonstrated
that the public grossly overestimates both the frequency and the success rate of the insanity
defense plea. This overestimation is a product of the media publicity accorded to certain
notorious criminal cases, virtually none ofwhich involved defendants actually found NGRI.").
100. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 108.
101. Brusca, supra note 97, at 1166 (discussing varying reactions to the postpartum
psychosis defense); MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 195 n.56 (discussing a life sentence
imposed in a Cincinnati case). Jennie Lusk has questioned whether this disparity is a
function of differences in "race and class." Lusk, supra note 19, at 104 (citation omitted).
Compare Gordan, supra note 64, at 102 (one-third of all infanticidal murder defendants in
the United Kingdom released on bail pending trial).
102. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 185.
103. For a review of the case law, see id. at 187-94, and Schwartz & Isser, supra note 75,
at 707-13. On the "incoherence" of the disparity in charges and dispositions, see MOTHERS
WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 58. For a thoughtful analysis of three such cases, see Beth E.
Bookwalter, Throwing the Bath Water Out with the Baby: Wrongful Exclusion of Expert
Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1185, 1194-96 (1998) (discussing State
v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); State v. Buffm, 511 So. 2d 1255 (La. Ct. App.
1987); and People v. Wernick 674 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1996)).
104. Oberman, supra note 12, at 81.
105. See MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 76-79.
106. Brusca, supra note 97, at 1136. Cf Connie Huang, It's a Hormonal Thing:
Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis as Criminal Defenses, 11 S. CAL. REv. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 345, 353-54 (2002) (citing 1 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1276 (Benjamin Sadock & Virginia Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000)
which speculates that Hippocrates may have been referring to "puerperal fever," an infectious
disease of childbirth.)).
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depression, to the most severe, postpartum psychosis. 107 "Maternity
blues" are common (and considered 'normal'), and their impact is
usually seen as "trivial, fleeting,"'0 l and affect eighty-five percent
of all new mothers.'09 Postpartum depression, which is more severe,
affects ten to fifteen percent of all mothers, and is characterized by
"irritability, anxiety, fatigue, lack of love for the child, and a sense
of guilt and inadequacy related to the inability to function as a
mother.""0 Postpartum psychosis, on the other hand, is characterized
by a "severe break with reality and a severely impaired ability to
function due to hallucinations or delusions, usually related to the
newborn baby.""' This disorder affects relatively few women," 2 and
is often marked by the presence of Brief Psychotic Disorder 113
and/or Depersonalization Disorder"4 .
Postpartum psychosis is marked by denial." 5 Women with this
mental disorder deny they are pregnant,"' and it is the ubiquity of
this denial that has led at least one commentator to urge the
creation of a separate category: neonaticide syndrome:".7
107. Brusca, supra note 97, at 1139-44.
108. Id. at 1141.
109. See Pitt, Maternity Blues, 122 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 431, 433 (1973); MOTHERS WHO
KILL, supra note 8, at 77.
110. Brusca, supra note 97, at 1143 (citing, inter alia, Sydney Brandon, Depression After
Childbirth, 284 BRIT. MED. J. 613, 613 (1982)).
111. Liu, supra note 16, at 355 (citing, inter alia, ANN L. DUNNEWOLD, EVALUATION AND
TREATMENT OF POSTPARTUM EMOTIONAL DISORDERS 41 (1997)). See also Liu, supra note 16,
at 355-56 ("Hearing auditory hallucinations in which voices urge them to kill their children,
new mothers typically exhibit strange behavioral tendencies in which they isolate themselves
from others, stop speaking, suffer severe sleep deprivation, and/or undergo extreme
emotional volatility.').
112. See MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 12 (1 out of 2000).
113. See Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 205-07 ("Thus, the diagnostic criteria for Brief
Psychotic Disorder are the presence of one or more of the following symptoms: 1) delusions;
2) hallucinations; 3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence); 4) grossly
disorganized or catatonic behavior.")
114. See id.:
Thus, the criteria for Depersonalization Disorder include: 1) persistent or
recurrent episodes of the individual feeling like they are watching their body
or mind from outside; 2) intact reality testing during the depersonalization
episode; and 3) the depersonalization results in "clinically significant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Id. at 207-08.
115. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 39-60.
116. Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Rethinking the Tough Sentencing of Teenage
Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3109,3133 (1999). See, e.g.,
People v. Chavez, 176 P. 2d 92, 92 (Cal. App. 1947) (discussing defendant's belief that she
was having "an attack of 'cramps'); State v. Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321, 328 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (discussing defendant's complaint of "bathroom' problems').
117. See Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 216-34.
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Such a syndrome would consist of evidence introduced
by the testimony of expert witnesses of common
patterns of behavior in cases of neonaticide, such as
denial of pregnancy, and self-deluding rationalization
of the physical manifestations of pregnancy. The
evidence introduced would thus serve to explain the
behavior of a particular defendant within a recognized
and documented pattern of behavior and clinically
verified symptoms."'
This strategy was specifically rejected by the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Wernick, 9 notwithstanding the fact that such
a syndrome appears to fit squarely within Professor Steven Morse's
definition-" [a] syndrome, in medical terminology, is the collection or
configuration of objective signs (e.g., fever) and subjective symptoms
(e.g., pain) that together constitute the description of a recognizable
pathological condition."' °
I will now turn to the insanity defense to consider its application
to cases involving defendants with these mental disorders.
PART III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
I have been writing about the insanity defense for more than
three decades 2' (even since before I began to practice law) and
turned to it as a serious focus for my scholarship some fourteen
years ago.'22 Although I have sought to explain the subtle doctrinal
differences between the major insanity defense tests23 and the even
more subtle distinctions between the positions taken by major
moral philosophers on the meaning of such terms as "rationality," 124
I have chosen, instead, to focus most of my attention on the myths
118. Id. at 180.
119. 674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) ("No threshold evidentiary foundation whatsoever
was offered that acknowledged the validity or existence of defense counsel's postulate to
warrant these experts using this kind of extrapolated material to bolster their expert
opinions").
120. Steven Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Clinical Review,
23 CRIME & Just. 329, 364 (1998). See also Robert Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony, and the Distinctions Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 45, 93 ("a psychological syndrome is a clinically significant pattern of impaired
psychological functioning").
121. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense in English Speaking African
Countries, 2 AFRICAN L. STUDIES 73 (1969).
122. See, e.g., Perlin, Myths, supra note 9; Perlin, OCS, supra note 9.
123. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 73-96.
124. See id. at 128-32; Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 666 (discussing positions of Steven
Morse and Michael Moore).
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that have developed about the insanity defense,"2 the ways that the
defense has become contaminated by heuristic reasoning126 and the
false use of OCS, 27 and the ways that sanism and pretextuality
have ultimately poisoned and corrupted this area of the law."2
I have done this because I believe that the core question we
must address here is one that has been constant over the centuries
(perhaps millennia)-"why do we feel the way that we do about
these people?"l 9-and that, if we fail to come to grips with that
question, we are in danger of reducing this entire enterprise to an
interesting and highly intellectualized parlor game.
I have now written extensively in my attempts to answer this
question, and am comfortable with my preliminary conclusions. s °
Yet, as I continue to do research and to think about this area of
the law, there have always been a few strands of the jurisprudence
that, somehow, looked different, including cases, by way of example,
that involve "syndromic" behaviors (frequently, behaviors with
identifiably cultural or behavioral bases).' 1s These cases have
125. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 105-14.
126. See id. at 271-84.
127. See id. at 305-10.
128. This is not to say that these 'subtle distinctions' are not important (nor to say that
the scholars who write eloquently and passionately and persuasively about them are
expending time on inconsequential problems). Simply, my sense is that unless we come to
grips with the questions on which I have chosen to focus, we cannot make authentic
'progress' in reconstructing the jurisprudence in this area. See Perlin, Myths, supra note 9,
at 641:
As I will subsequently demonstrate, it is futile to be terribly concerned with the
question of which school of moral philosophy "wins" or which set of scientific
data is soundest or which database of empirical evidence is most persuasive.
For the empiricist, the scientist and the moral philosopher all base their
arguments on one important but unarticulated premise: that fact-finders are
capable of being rational, fair and bias-free in their assessment of insanity
defense cases, and it is only the absence of a missing link-the additional,
irrefutable data as to NGRI demographics, the newest discovery in brain
biology, the exact calibration of moral agency in the allocation of
responsibility-that stands in the way of a coherent and well-functioning system.
Yet, there is virtually no evidence that the addition of any (or all) of these extra
factors really would make any such difference.
Id. at 641.
129. See PERLIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10, at 223-24.
130. See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10; Perlin, Myths, supra note 9; Perlin, OCS,
supra note 9; Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4.
131. See PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITYLAw, supra note 13, § 9A-9.3, at 264. On the specific
question of the implications of accepting evidence of "female hormonal disorders" as a legal
defense, see Huang, supra note 104, at 362-67. When I first wrote about this question
thirteen years ago, I considered it from this perspective:
In the past decade, there has been an explosion of interest, research, and study
of groups such as battered spouses and Vietnam veterans-groups whose
members frequently exhibit so-called "syndromic" behaviors. While there has
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involved individuals with premenstrual stress syndrome," 2
Vietnam stress syndrome,13 battered woman's syndrome, 134 the
disorder of pathological gambling, 35 and a host of other syndrome-
based defenses, 36 including, inter alia, postpartum depression. 37
How do jurors respond to such cases? A broad-based
examination of insanity defense cases demonstrates, beyond any
doubt, that when jurors err, they are globally more likely to commit
the error of the false negative: overwhelmingly, they reject the
insanity defense in cases of defendants who authentically should
have been found to have met the standard for criminal
nonresponsibility. 3 There are many reasons for this (reasons that
I have sought to explore exhaustively in other work),3 9 but what
connects all these reasons is our fear that a factually-guilty person
will "escape" punishment."' We adhere resolutely to this idee fixe
in spite of uncontradicted (indeed, uncontradictable) evidence that:
(1) the insanity defense is rarely successful,"' (2) a failed insanity
defense translates into significantly longer prison sentences than
been significant scholarship devoted to the individual substantive syndromes,
there has been virtually no attention paid to the legal implications of their use
in insanity defense cases. For a rare example, see [sic] McCord, Syndromes,
Profiles and Other Mental Exotica" A New Approach to the Admissibility of
Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19,
64-69 (1987). On the question of the public's negative view toward defendants
asserting such syndromes in insanity defense cases, see [Phillip J.] Resnick,
[Perceptions ofPsychiatric Testimony:A Historical Perspective on the Hysterical
Invective, 14 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L 203,208 (1986)]:
Today, the public views the following diagnoses as unjustly 'getting
criminal off': dissociative reaction, the "Twinkie" defense,
post-Vietnam stress disorder, temporal lobe epilepsy, premenstrual
syndrome, and pathological gambling. The closer a defendant is to
normality, the more public opinion is outraged by insanity acquittals.
People are unwilling to excuse conduct that appears to have a
rational criminal motive.
Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 616-17 n.75.
132. See PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABILrY LAW, supra note 13, § 9A-9.3a, at 266-70.
133. See id. § 9A-9.3b., at 271-74.
134. See id. § 9A-9.3c., at 275-79.
135. See id. § 9A-9.3d., at 279-81.
136. See id. § 9A-9.3e., at 181-84.
137. Others include "captivity syndrome," "confusional arousal syndrome," "black rage"
defense, "Russian dmigr6" syndrome, "detail phobia," "homosexual anxiety panic syndrome,"
"hostage syndrome," "racial paranoia-induced delusional disorder defense," and "adopted
child syndrome.' See id. § 9A-9.3e, at 282-84, and nn.987-96 (citing cases).
138. For a representative sample, see PERLIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10.
139. I believe one of the important reasons for this phenomenon is the inability of jurors
to empathize with most insanity pleaders. See Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 697-700.
140. See Perlin, supra note 26, at 236; Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1423.
141. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 108-09.
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those imposed on otherwise-like defendants for like crimes,142 (3) a
successful insanity defense translates into longer terms of
institutionalization in maximum security confinement (albeit in a
forensic "hospital" rather than in a prison),4 ' and (4) evidence of
successfully malingered insanity defenses is rare to the point of
being virtually nonexistent.
144
Notwithstanding all of this, however, there remain three
statistically insignificant, but politically and culturally important,
mini-universes of insanity defense cases in which it appears that
jurors have acquitted defendants who do not necessarily meet the
substantive insanity standard. 145 These are cases-"nullification
verdicts" of a sort'"-that I have called "empathy outliers". 1 7
Unlike the typical insanity-pleading defendant (who fills jurors
with fear and loathing), these defendants puzzle jurors: "How could
this defendant have committed such an inexplicable and irrational
crime? She must have been crazy!" These cases fall into:
[T]hree general categories of defendants: who not only did not
appear to be 'insane' under the prevailing substantive test, but
seemed to be the recipients of jury sympathy: (1) mothers
committing infanticide;48 (2) law enforcement officials; and (3)
a category labeled as the [we]-can-feel-sorry-for-you people-
individuals with whom the jurors could empathize. 49 Over a
ten year period, over two-thirds of all insanity acquittees in
one jurisdiction fell into "categories of classes not necessarily
predisposed to commit additional crimes."'
142. Id. at 107-09.
143. Id. at 109-10.
144. Id. at 111-12.
145. Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 701.
146. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1421. I have suggested that these cases may
also reflect a kind ofprosecutorial nullification: "prosecutors, like other citizens, 'feel sorry'
for this tiny sub-group of insanity pleaders, and choose to allow such defendants to 'evade'
responsibility." Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 704.
147. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 192. See also Oberman, supra note 12, at
42 (discussing this in this precise context).
148. There are very few examples in the reported case law literature of the actual
proffered use of postpartum psychosis as the basis for an insanity defense. See Daniel Katkin,
Postpartum Psychosis, Infanticide, and the Law, 15 CRIME, L. & Socy 109, 119 (1991)
("postpartum psychosis has been offered as a legal defense in a small number of infanticide
cases"). For a well-known case in which such an effort was unsuccessful, see People v.
Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996), discussed supra at text accompanying note 119.
Wernick is criticized on these grounds in Bookwalter, supra note 103.
149. Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 701; See also Perlin, Borderline supra note 4, at 1420-21.
150. Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 701 n.480, (citing Scott Sherman, Guilty But Mentally
Ill. A Retreat From the Insanity Defense, 7 AMER. J.L. & MED. 237, 261 (1981)). See also
Richard Pasewark et al., The Insanity Plea in New York State, 1965-1976, 51 N.Y.ST. B.J.
186, 224 (1979) (of thirty-nine female NGRI's in sample, eighteen had been tried for
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Some claim that we view postpartum defendants as "insane
because 'society seems unwilling to critically examine its belief in
the concept of 'mother love,' because institutionalized sexism,
masquerading as 'judicial chivalry,' allows us to accept 'certain
cultural transgressions' more readily from women than from men."' 5'
For decades, we had accommodated ourselves to this anomaly
(especially, perhaps, because the defendant most likely to be the
recipient of juror largesse was more likely to have a higher socio-
economic status),'52 and we accept the fact that postpartum
syndrome, like other syndromes, in the right case may, in fact, be
a legitimate basis for an insanity defense.'53 And there is no
question that the vast majority of these defendants suffer from
some sort of mental disability.'
When I wrote The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense55 in
1993, I had no sense that this was about to change. The
"infamous"156 case of Susan Smith, however, radically altered the
way that we came to construct all of these cases. Smith told us the
"big lie" and betrayed the greater community157-not by killing her
children, but by appealing to our sympathy and empathy and then
kicking us in our unconscious and leaving us with a "sense
of betrayal."'" Suddenly, the Smith case, a made-for-the-media
circus, 59 radically and dramatically altered the way we thought
about infanticide and neonaticide cases (even if the latter category
shared nothing in common with the facts of the Smith case).80
Instead of talking about whether the insanity defense should apply
to such killings, 161 we debate whether this was a capital punishment-
worthy case (a scenario tracked eerily five years later in the Andrea
infanticide; of 239 acquitees in sample, four were police officers; the third over-represented
group was composed primarily of "previously respectable, middle class individuals").
151. Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 702 (quoting Pasewark et al., supra note 150, at 224)
(internal citations omitted).
152. Oberman, supra note 12, at 45.
153. Barton, supra note 7, at 604-05; Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 205.
154. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 93.
155. See PERUN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5.
156. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8 at 68.
157. Ford, supra note 4, at 543.
158. Id. (discussing the outrage felt by those who had attempted to locate Smith's 'missing'
children).
159. See MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 39 (discussing"rabid media coverage" of the
Smith case).
160. Smith's children were fourteen months and three years old at the time she killed
them. See Ford, supra note 4, at 521.
161. There is no question that Susan Smith was mentally ill, though likely not insane. See
MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 72.
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Yates case).162 I am convinced that we did not want to execute
Susan Smith for the homicides of her infant children, but for
making fools of us--conning us into feeling sorry for her.
168
Furthermore, by the time of the Yates trial, juror "disgust" at such
a vile act trumped any prior feelings of outlier empathy, and
contaminated any attempts to reach an objective and just verdict.1 64
Although scholars such as Robert Goldstein warned us years
before the Susan Smith case of the 'she-must-be-crazy fallacy,"6
and although scholars such as Michelle Oberman had, in the
immediate wake of Susan Smith, noted that the insanity defense
was inappropriate in some infanticide cases, 166 the Smith case, like
John Hinckley's insanity case, irrevocably shifted the debate.'67
Linda Chavez, by way of example, referred to infanticidal mothers
as "monster-women."'6 Commentators writing in the post-Susan
Smith years warned direly of the potentiality of insanity defense
abuses 169 and raise the shopworn specter that defendants are
162. See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L.
REV. 97, 120 (2002):
Perhaps one could argue that the greater use of existing capital statutes in
states with greater criminal justice populism makes abolition that much more
unthinkable; but one could also argue that greater use of capital punishment
is more likely to produce . . . controversial cases, like the recent capital
prosecution of Andrea Yates in Texas ....
Id. at 120 (citation omitted).
A question that we might have to face in such a case - were a jury to deliberate on
the question of capital punishment - is whether evidence as to mental status that had been
introduced in support of mitigation would be inappropriately construed by jurors as evidence
in support of aggravation. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) ("[Rleliance
on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the
likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury").
163. Cf. Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant,
and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss?", 29 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1, 98 (1987) (discussing defendants whose insanity defense pleas are unsuccessful
("IT]hey have made a 'play for our unconscious, and have come up short")).
164. See Elizabeth Bangs, Disgust and the Drownings in Texas: The Law Must Tackle
Emotion When Women Kill, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 87, 95 (2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS
OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes, ed., 1999)[hereinafter PASSIONS]), assessing the Yates case (and
our response to it) in the context of Professor Martha C. Nussbaum's definition of disgust as
"a rejection of a possible contaminant. The core objects of disgust are reminders of mortality
and animality, seen as contaminants to the human." (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Secret
Sewers of Vice:"Digust, Bodies and the Law, in PASSIONS, id. at 19, 26).
165. Robert Goldstein, The Psychiatrist's Guide to Right and Wrong: Part HI: Postpartum
Depression and the "Appreciation"of Wrongfulness, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 121,
125 (1989).
166. Oberman, supra note 12, at 31-33.
167. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 17-24, 279-80.
168. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 168 (citing Linda Chavez, The Tragic Story of
Medea Still Lives, DENVER POST, Dec. 3, 1995, at E04).
169. Brusca, supra note 97, at 1168; Megan C. Hogan, Neonaticide and the Misuse of the
Insanity Defense, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 259, 264-65 (1999).
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"getting away with murder;"' as a result, the insanity defense has
become as unattractive an option for these defendants as for all
other defendants with mental disabilities post-Hinckley. 7 1
Consider in this context the pre-Susan Smith but post-
Hinckley North Carolina case of State v. Holden. '72 There, the
trial court found that a seventeen year old mother with mental
retardation and a history of severe past and present abuse was
responsible for killing her three month old child because she was
able to form a false story.13 The judge reasoned that, if she could
fabricate a story, she had cognitive abilities sufficient to hold
her responsible for the crime.'74 Of course, the ability to fabricate
a story is not evidence that one does not meet the insanity standard;
although there may be a connection between the two, there is
nothing in the law to suggest this kind of dyadic choice.
Interestingly, here, the defendant had not even pled insanity,
but had asked for a mitigated sentence based on her diminished
mental capacity. 175  Nonetheless, the trial judge mistakenly
construed this request as an argument asserting insanity.' v
170. Liu, supra note 16, at 374 (quoting W. Gaylin, Legal Insanity: Gone Bonkers, WASH.
POST, June 20, 1982, at C1).
171. See, e.g., John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity
Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Difference?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 85 (1994).
172. 365 S.E. 2d 626 (N.C. 1988) (affi-ming conviction).
173. Id. at 626-30. The defendant eventually pled guilty to second-degree murder.
174. Id. at 630.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 627-29:
Defendant, who was conceived when her thirteen-year-old mother was
raped by her stepfather, was constantly reminded of her incestuous origins
and made to feel responsible for turmoil within the family. Defendant's
mother often told defendant that she wished she had never been born, that
she wanted to kill her, and that she was in the way. Defendant's own
complaints of sexual molestation by a family member were ignored.
Defendant began her relationship with David Johnson when she was
thirteen. Johnson subjected her to constant physical and emotional abuse,
beating her face and abdomen with his fists and threatening to molest the
children. During both of defendant's pregnancies Johnson raped her
repeatedly in an attempt to harm both her and the unborn child.
Defendant's mother and Johnson incessantly berated defendant for
becoming pregnant a second time. They told her that no one wanted the
baby yet refused to allow defendant to put Dekavia up for adoption. After
[child's] birth, much verbal abuse within the family centered on
defendant's parental inadequacies. She became convinced that she was not
capable of caring for the children competently. During stressful periods,
defendant would hear voices censuring her and talking about [child]. These
auditory hallucinations were very active on the day of the drowning.
Id. at 627-29.
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Holden is a textbook case of how a trial judges' sanism177 can
contaminate an infanticide case. 1
7
Mothers diagnosed with postpartum psychosis pleading the
insanity defense in neonaticide cases have little in common
with those diagnosed with postpartum depression who plead the
defense in infanticide cases, but the post-Susan Smith paradigm
shift has conflated and confounded these cases and these mental
disabilities. Our anger at Susan Smith has so pervaded our
criminal justice system that we deny the profundity of the mental
illness suffered by many of the neonaticidal mothers. 179 In the
words of one observer, "How did we become so mean?"'80 As a result,
justice continues to suffer.
There is little to cull from the reported case law in this area.' 8'
As I have already noted, in the post-Susan Smith era, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed a neonaticide conviction, concluding that
the trial court did not err in precluding expert testimony on
neonaticide syndrome," 2 concluding that "neo-naticide syndrome
did not meet the threshold of general scientific acceptability."1 83 On
the other hand, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals remanded
177. See infra Part IV. See generally PERLIN, HIDDEN supra note 10, at 50-55.
178. For other similar post-Hinckley, pre-Susan Smith cases, see also State v. Klafta, 831
P. 2d 512 (Haw. 1992) (affirming sentence of 15 years to life); State v. Mitchell, 781 S.W.2d
510 (Ky. 1990), reh. den. (1990) (defendant sentenced to twenty years in prison). But see id.
at 512, 514 (Leibson, J., dissenting) (discussing defendant's "serious mental illness");
Commonwealth v. Reilly, 549 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1988) (affirming defendant's conviction of third-
degree murder).
179. On the issues of whether the use of the insanity defense is "a benefit or detriment to
the cause of women,' see Huang, supra note 106, at 346-48.
180. See Lewicki, supra note 22, at 710:
Questions of the potential culpability of the community frequently appear
wherever an incident occurs.. .Also striking is some of the aftermath of the
case of Amanda Wallace, an insane woman who killed her son within days
of his re-release to her by the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services. Wallace was first sentenced to death, the charge later being
commuted to life in prison. Following the initial sentencing, a psychologist
who had known Ms. Wallace since she was seven remarked 'it's absolutely
ridiculous to even think of executing someone like Amanda Wallace. She
is ill. What is society's excuse. How did we become so mean?' Don Terry,
Mother Sentenced to Life in a Killing That Shook Chicago, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1996, at A14. Later, Patrick Murphy, the Cook County Public
Guardian said, 'everyone in the system failed Joey Wallace, including me
.... She is very, very insane. But we're all getting off scot-free. She's going
to spend the rest of her life in prison.' Id.
Lewicki, supra note 22, at 710 n.57.
181. There is also not much that is new. See State v. Richmond, 7 So. 459 (La. 1890), for
a decision rejecting expert testimony on "puerperal mania" in an infanticide case.
182. People v. Wernick, 674 N.E. 2d 322, 324-26 (N.Y. 1996).
183. Id. at 325. But Cf Morse, supra note 120 (defining "syndrome").
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a first-degree murder conviction, ordering the trial judge to enter a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,1 4 reasoning that the
State had failed to prove that the appellant was "capable of
appreciating the wrongfulness of her conduct and conforming her
conduct to the requirements of the law."" 5 In a California case
where a defense witness had testified that the defendant was
suffering from "a kind of neonaticide dissociative syndrome,"'86 the
appellate court reduced the jury's verdict of second-degree murder
to manslaughter, because of "insufficient evidence of malice."'87
That is essentially all there is. Certainly, there is no body of law
from which we can extrapolate any overarching legal principles.
PART IV. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND ORDINARY COMMON SENSE
My explanation for why this happens is premised, to a
significant degree, on the extent to which sanism and pretextuality
continue to contaminate the criminal justice system." s I define
sanism as:
an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of
other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in)
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and
ethnic bigotry. It infects both our jurisprudence and our
lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely
socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype,
myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained
and perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense"
184. State v. Hudson, 1999 WL 77844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
185. Id. at *8:
There was uncontested testimony in this case that defendant's behavior
included the act of laying a crucifix on her pregnant sister's stomach confirming
that the child was the son of Satan, [her] conversation with the Devil at a bar,
her staying up all night to color and sleeping throughout the day, her fascination
with becoming the queen of a motorcycle club and her face-to-face conversation
with God.
Id.
186. People v. Anderson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 568 (Cal. App. 4th 1999).
187. Id. at 571-72.
188. See Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 33, at 26:
I have begun to write regularly-relentlessly, I might even say-about sanism
and pretextuality, so as to seek to expose their pernicious power, the ways in
which two factors infect judicial decisions, legislative enactments,
administrative directives, jury behavior, and public attitudes, the ways that
these factors undercut any efforts at creating a unified body of mental disability
law jurisprudence, and the ways that these factors contaminate scholarly
discourse and lawyering practices alike.
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(OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to
events both in everyday life and in the legal process.189
I define "pretextuality" as the ways in which courts:
accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and
engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious)
decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert
witnesses, show a high propensity to purposely distort their
testimony in order to achieve desired ends. This pretextuality is
poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system,
breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants,
and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging, and, at times,
perjurious and/or corrupt testifying.190
All aspects of mental disability law are pervaded by sanism and
by pretextuality, no matter whether the specific presenting topic is
involuntary civil commitment law,191 right to refuse treatment
law,192 the sexual rights of persons with mental disabilities, 93 or
any aspect of the criminal trial process. 94 I have written
extensively about the ways that sanism and pretextuality pervade
our insanity defense policies, 9 ' and I am convinced that it is
impossible to remotely understand how that jurisprudence has
developed without a full consideration of the malignant and
corrosive impact of these factors. Pretextuality in mental disability
law is "reflected consciously, in the reception and privileging of
'moral' testimony that flouts legislative criteria, and unconsciously,
in the use of heuristic devices in decisionmaking, and in the
application of sanist attitudes toward such decisions. " "'
Underlying much of sanism and pretextuality is our
meretricious use of OCS, a "powerful unconscious animator of legal
decision making."'97 "[WIhere defendants do not conform to 'popularimages of "craziness,"' the notion of handicapping mental disability
is flatly and unthinkingly rejected." 9 8 In arguing why it is essential
189. Perlin, Half-Wracked, supra note 33, at 4-5 (internal citations omitted).
190. Id. at 5 (internal citations omitted).
191. See PERLIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10, at 79-112.
192. See id. at 125-56.
193. See id. at 157-74.
194. See id. at 205-58.
195. See, e.g., id. at 223-44.
196. Michael L. Perlin, 'There's No Success Like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All":
Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1260 (1998).
197. Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 22-23. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
198. Id. at 24. (quoting Harold Lasswell, Foreward to RICHARD ARENS, THE INsANrTY
DEFENSE xi (1974)).
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to understand OCS if we are to understand why insanity defense
attitudes have developed as they have, I have written:
Not only is it "prereflective" and "self-evident," it is susceptible
to precisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive decisionmaking
that has traditionally typified insanity defense legislation and
litigation. It also ignores our rich, cultural, heterogenic fabric
that makes futile any attempt to establish a unitary level of
OCS to govern decision making in an area where we have
traditionally been willing to base substantive criminal law
doctrine on medieval conceptions of sin, redemption, and
religiosity. 199
I believe that it is our reliance on OCS - a self-referential, non-
reflective, self-absorbed way of seeing the world at large and the
legal system in particular-that helps to illuminate much of what
happens when we decide neonaticide cases or when we discuss in
the public media how we feel about such cases.2 °0 We seek to
simplify our information-processing tasks by engaging in heuristic
thinking and by taking refuge in a false OCS. Both of these limiting
and narrowing devices cut us adrift from critical thinking and both
offer overly-pat solutions for complex behavior. OCS, simply put, is
an "incomplete and imperfect tool by which to assess criminality,"0 1
especially in cases that conjure up so many vivid stereotypes as do
infanticide or neonaticide cases. I have characterized our use of
OCS in confrontation clause and confessions case in this manner
"[J]ust as OCS cannot be employed as the tool by which confessions
or confrontation clause cases can be charted, neither is it applicable
to insanity defense law jurisprudence, where human behavior is
very often opposite to what OCS would suggest. 2 °2 I believe that
this is even more so in infanticide or neonaticide cases. Certainly,
our predictable patterns of "over-indicting and under-convicting" '2
reflects the rankest sort of pretextuality in this context.
Through the typification heuristic, "people characterize a
current experience via reference to past stereotypic behavior." °4
Through the vividness heuristics, we learn that "a single, vivid,
199. Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted).
200. On the ways that media depictions of such cases "los[e] sight" of factual data. See
Schwartz & Isser, supra note 77, at 712.
201. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 291.
202. Id. at 294.
203. See supra text accompanying note 103.
204. See Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1417 (citing Mark Snyder et al., Social
Perception and Interpersonal Behaviors: On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes,
35 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656, 657 (1977)).
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memorable case overwhelms the mountains of abstract, colorless
data on which rational choices should be made."05 In these ways,
we highlight the worst-case anecdote, and make that a template for
all behavior (and all expected outcomes). We use such cognitive-
simplifying heuristic devices' to reinforce pre-existing stereotypes," 7
and allows us to willfully blind ourselves to the "gray areas" of
human behavior. OCS is the ultimate form of self-referentiality,
and its use estops us from looking at issues from external and/or
alternative points of view.208 Writing recently about juror behavior
in insanity defense cases, Jennifer L. Skeem and Stephen L. Golding
thus underscored that juror concepts of "commonsense justice" (a
close relative of OCS)0 9 are likely to result in "legally incorrect or
even highly prejudicial [case judgments] .210
This morass leads us to impose a dyadic straightjacket on
neonaticidal defendants. They are either crazy or they are evil.21'
Pretextually, we overcharge these defendants because we wish to
tell the public that they are evil, and we will not let them "get away
with it," 212 but we then under-convict them because we realize that
they are, if not insane, "crazy."21 We either empathize (perhaps, in
some cases, overempathize) or we engage in our own version of
denial: we deny that such defendants may, in fact, be mentally ill
(perhaps using false OCS to rationalize in a sanist way: "I didn't
succumb to the 'baby blues'; if she did, she must have a weak moral
character. She's no crazier than IM). The reasoning of the trial judge
205. See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction:
Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 517,536 n.118 (1992-94) (citing
David Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy, 19 STAN. LAw., Fall 1984, at
10, 13); see also supra note 18 (citing sources).
206. See Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is Good, You'll Find Out
When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans With Disabilities Act (and
Olmsteadv. L.C.)Anything More Than "Idiot Wind?", 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM235,250 (2002).
207. See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 660 (1993).
208. PERLIN, HIDDEN, supra note 10, at 20.
209. See Norman J. Finkel, But It's Not Fair! Commonsense Notions of Unfairness, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 898 (2000).
210. Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Describing Jurors' Personal Conceptions
of Insanity and Their Relationship to Case Judgments, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 561, 562
(2001) (citing Peter English & Bruce Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the
Comprehension of Jury Instructions. 3 PSYCHOL. PUB PoL'Y& L. 381 (1997), and Vicky Smith,
Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 76 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL., 76, 220 (1991)).
211. Oberman, supra note 12, at 43. On the significance of the"mad/bad" dichotomy in this
context, see MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 69-70.
212. E.g., Laura E. Reece, Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal
Infanticide, 38 UCLA L. REv. 699, 750 (1991).
213. Oberman, supra note 12, at 81.
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in the North Carolina case of State v. Holden-that the defendant
must be responsible because she had the cognitive ability to
fabricate a story after she killed her child2 1 -is a perfect exemplar
of this reasoning. This is also totally in line with the prosecutorial
gambit that argues to the jury, in efforts to rebut insanity, that the
defendant was "intelligent enough to feign mental illness."215
Dr. Caryl Boehnert has suggested that individuals who commit
crimes that fall below the "community tolerance threshold," and
thus would not trigger a concomitantly high level of community
outrage, are more readily found not guilty by reason of insanity. 1
6
Dr. Daniel Schwartz has suggested that the success of an insanity
plea frequently hinges on a defendant's "likeability."2M Before
Susan Smith, neonaticidal defendants did not trigger such a high
level of "community outrage" and were seen as more likeable
(perhaps because when we saw their pictures on television or in the
press, we did not characterize them as people we recognized as
hardened killers) than most other criminal defendants. In
subsequent years, that has changed.
In an extraordinarily insightful student note, Judith Macfarlane
has explained why testimony in neonaticide cases is subversive, 218
"because it questions society's existing morals by countering
conventional myths and misconceptions of human nature."219 This
insight must be considered carefully and thoughtfully if we are ever
to make any progress in reforming this area of the law.
In short, we have seen a major change in our construction of
neonaticide cases. Infanticide cases had, until relatively recently,
been statistically over-represented in terms of the numbers of
insanity defenses pled. 22' By way of example, one study of
infanticide cases revealed that one-third of the cohort studied
involved successful insanity defense pleas,221 while that number is
214. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
215. Fulgum v. Ford, 850 F. 2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1988). I discuss the implications of
Fulgum in Perlin, Myths, supra note 9, at 717-18.
216. See, Perlin, Myths, supra note 9 at 744, discussing Caryl E. Boehnert, Psychological
and Demographic Factors Associated With Individuals Using the Insanity Defense, 13 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 27-28 (1985).
217. Daniel Schwartz, The Proper Use of a Psychiatric Expert, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINALADVOCACY97, 111 (Juris. G. Cederbaums & Selma Arnold eds., 1975).
218. Macfarlane, supra note 20, at 214.
219. Id. (quoting Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization:
Expert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome,
25 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 277, 281 (1992)).
220. See Katkin, supra note 99, at 279.
221. Id.
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a fraction of one percent when all felony cases are considered.222
This changed dramatically following the case of Susan Smith. The
schema that we had earlier created-the forlorn, almost pathetic
young woman who commits a crime so inexplicable that it must
have been the product of her mental illness22 -was eradicated and
replaced by a picture of, again in the words of Linda Chavez,
"monster women."224 In each case, jurors demonstrated their
sanism,22 by using a fatally-flawed faux OCS.22 6 Authentic and
reflective common sense has become irrelevant to the disposition of
neonaticide cases.
PART V. CONCLUSION
While mental disability law jurisprudence and insanity defense
jurisprudence are incoherent, neonaticide jurisprudence is
especially incoherent. We take refuge in a sanism-drenched, false
and distorted OCS, and we use this to inherently rationalize self-
contradictory and pretextual social policies and legal decisions. We
do this blindly and with little consideration for the implications of
what we do.
Several commentators have offered attractive, thoughtful
suggestions as to how this problem might be, optimally, remediated.22
Jennie Lusk, for example, has made these recommendations: to
"further investigate the medical origins of neonaticide," to "encourage
222. See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 108.
223. I use this phrase ("product of her mental illness") consciously and carefully. This, of
course, was the insanity test made famous in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862
(D.C.Cir. 1954), overruled by, United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C.Cir.1972). See
PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 5, at 86-89 (explaining how Durham was the "first
modem break from the M'Naghten approach" to the insanity defense, and discussing the
ensuing criticism by judges and some commentators). I believe, to some extent, that jurors
in pre-Susan Smith infanticide cases were intuitively using a Durham-like formula in these
cases.
224. MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 8, at 168.
225. For a specific consideration of this phenomenon in the death penalty context, see
Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of
"Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY. 239
(1994).
226. See e.g., Perlin, Borderline, supra note 4, at 1425; Perlin, supra note 49, at 43.
227. Susan Hickman and Donald Levine argue that the "taboo" on discussing and thinking
about neonaticidal behavior is "lifting" for three reasons: the proliferation of support groups,
academic conferences, and expanded media coverage. See Susan Hickman & Donald Levine,
Postpartum Disorders and the Law, in POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS: A PICTURE
PUZZLE, supra note 99, at 282, 294-95. See also id. at 295 ("With the new and open attention
directed toward postpartum psychosis illness, it is likely that the incidence of the disasters
of infanticide and suicide, and the incidence of erratic case dispositions, will decrease
markedly"). I hope the coming years offer some data to support these authors' optimism.
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neonaticidal mothers to share their birth, dating, and labor
experiences in sex education programs," to "use social science
studies to aid in identifying a population at risk for committing
neonaticide," to "consider the societal implications of our impulse to
shun neonaticidal mother[s]," and to "reform crime policy for
neonaticidal mothers."228
On the latter point she urges three specific reforms: the
creation of a "nenonaticide statute applicable to juveniles,"'
the requirement of "proofs of neonaticidal circumstances similar
to those provided by common law for the 'benefit of linen' defense"23 °
("[iin the 17th century, mothers were less likely to be prosecuted
after an otherwise suspicious infant death if they had prepared for
the birth, (the common law defense known as 'benefit of linen'")),23'
and the continuation of requiring "stringent proof both of intent and
actus reus in all murders." 2
Finally, Lita Schwartz and Nancy Isser have considered
neonaticide from the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence
(TJ).233 They conclude that TJ should lead trial courts to consider
228. Lusk, supra note 19, at 126-28.
229. Id. at 127-28.
230. Id. at 128.
231. Id. at 110.
232. Id. at 128. Lusk also asks a set of important psychological and behavioral questions:
Comparing the psychological evaluations of a larger group of neonaticidal
mothers might help in identifying a profile: are they, as some studies suggest,
markedly passive? Attached to their fathers or in fear of losing attachment with
their mothers? Do many of them maintain a relationship of any duration with
the father of the child, has the father disappeared long before the birth, and if
so, does his absence contribute to the death of the child? How do their
psychological scores of neonaticidal mothers compare with each other? What
happens in the years after a neonaticide? How do neonaticidal mothers mature?
Do they have psychological crises or depression when next they become
pregnant? Do they appear pregnant, experience menstruation during
pregnancy? Is the next pregnancy more normal?
Id. at 127.
233.
Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess the
ultimate impact of case law and legislation that affects mentally disabled
individuals, studying the role of the law as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that
substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers' roles may have either
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences, and questioning whether such
rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their
therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles.
Perlin, supra note 26, at 228. See generally THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed. 1990); ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991); LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.
1996); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J.
Winick ed. 1997).
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"alternatives to imprisonment," and legislators "to enact laws that
would encourage the judiciary to examine mitigating circumstances
and to exercise thoughtful judgment.""'
I applaud these recommendations, and largely concur with
them. But, my sense is that we are as a society still far from being
ready to make these changes. We remain, tragically, the prisoner
of cultural, behavioral and social myths and stereotypes that have
the ultimate effect of blunting any efforts at crafting a coherent and
thoughtful jurisprudence in this area of the law. 5 There is little
evidence that we should be optimistic about spontaneous social or
political change in this area, especially after the Andrea Yates trial.
Recall that when I explained the derivation of my title, I quoted
the rock critic Tim Riley, who argued that Dylan's song, Just Like
a Woman, "straddles an almost inconceivably thin line between
compassion and scorn, forgiveness and retribution."236 Think again
of the lyric that I used-"she breaks just like a little girl" - in the
context of this paper, consider the "fit," and then think of the bridge
to the song:
And your long-time curse hurts
But what's worse
Is this pain in here
I can't stay in here
Ain't it clear ..."'
I don't think Bob was thinking of neonaticide cases when he
wrote this song thirty-seven years ago. But it's there: the curse, the
pain, the claustrophobic desperation. Maybe-just maybe-we can
make some modest progress in, again using Riley's words, changing
"scorn" and "retribution" to "compassion" and "forgiveness." 8
234. Schwartz & Isser, supra note 77, at 715. Here they draw on the work of Christopher
Slobogin and Mark Fondacaro, see Christopher Slobogin & Mark Fondacaro, Rethinking
Deprivations or Liberty: Possible Contributions from Therapeutic and Ecological
Jurisprudence, 18 BEHAV. SC. & L. 499 (2000), on the models for justification of
imprisonment as a "starting point for legislators and judges alike." Schwartz & laser, supra
note 77, at 715.
235. See Perlin, OCS, supra note 9, at 4-5 (insanity defense is a prisoner of myths about
the connection between mental illness, crime, and punishment).
236. RILEY, supra note 38, at 139.
237. DYLAN, supra note 34, at 231.
238. RILEY, supra note 38, at 139.
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